Abstract: This article presents an analysis of the regulation of transfer prices, specifically inquiring about the purpose of establishing this obligation with tax havens. In this regard, it is argued that the application of this regime with tax havens has the purpose of disciplining and punishing States that resist entering neoliberal economic globalization. To explain this thesis, an analysis is carried out from the analytical Marxism of Gerald Cohen on the international institutions that advocate full competition and unify tax regulations, such is the case of the OECD.
Keywords: Transfer pricing, multinationals, analytical Marxism, tax havens, globalization.
Economic globalization is a long-standing process, but one that in our recent history is marked by the expansion of neoliberalism and the legal and economic adaptation of States to a unified global order around freedom of capital and free competition. This translates into constitutional reforms and the enactment of organic laws that adjust the institutional system of each State based on recommendations from international institutions. The key to this process is to “unify” the treatment of private capital with respect to its free movement and guarantees, while adapting State action to the control of other types of economies that distort the neoliberal model.
In this general context, this article aims to address this problem in relation to the transfer pricing regime, which is applied in international tax auditing and is intended to prevent the erosion of the tax bases of the States involved in operations between economic linked and tax havens. At least that is how it is presented to us from the OECD and the tax authority, but as it is problematized in this writing, this purpose is partially true. Because it is argued that the application of this regime with tax havens has the purpose of disciplining and punishing States that resist entering neoliberal economic globalization. This thesis is reached by answering the following research question:
What is the political/economic purpose of establishing the transfer pricing obligation with tax havens without having an economic link from the critical perspective of Gerald Cohen?
This concern is the center of the academic dissertation presented in this proposal, which is developed in three sections, the first on the arm’s length principle where the global economic order is characterized, the OECD regulation in this regard is named, and some glosses are made on the transnational economic power of companies from the critical opinion of Gerald Cohen; In the second section, the transfer pricing obligation is addressed, explaining its usefulness and application, how it works in practice in the Colombian legal system, and the paradigm of “erosion of taxable bases” in tax havens is problematized. Finally, in the third section, a comparison is made of the purpose of transfer prices between economic link and tax havens, with the aim of finding their role in economic globalization and sustainable development.