In the academic literature there is a scarcity of studies regarding the impact of AI leak on national security. ‘AI Leak’ is an emerging concept which refers to the unintentional release or unauthorized access to sensitive machine learning models. A recent example was the leaked pre-trained model called ‘LLAMA’ which was developed by Meta’s (Facebook). The purpose of LLAMA is to generate human-like language processing for use cases such as virtual chatbot, translation or sentiment analysis. LLAMA model was accidentally made public by a Meta employee who uploaded it to a public GitHub repository, making it available for anyone to access and download. A leak could expose Meta’s proprietary language processing technology and expertise that could be used for competitors or adversaries to develop applications for intelligence gathering or spreading misinformation. AI, including large language models (LLMs), is considered by countries as a key enabling technology driving operational gains both for defense and commercial purposes. Recently released ASPI’s new Critical Technology Tracker reveals that that China has built a global lead relative to the US in 37 out of 44 crucial technology fields including in AI. The US Department of Defense (US DoD) is working on its own LLM, known as the ‘Gargantua’ program. The goal of the Gargantua program is to create LLMs that are capable of processing and understanding large amounts of unstructured text data, including potentially sensitive military data. The Gargantua program is still in development, but the DoD has stated that it sees significant potential for LLMs in a range of military applications, such as intelligence gathering, situational awareness, and decision making. My article explores a hypothetical scenario of Gargantua AI Leak in the context of security dilemma. First coined by John Herz in 1950, the security dilemma describes how the actions that one state takes to make itself more secure, such as the adoption of AI, tend to make other states less secure and lead them to respond in kind. I explore how such a leak could differ from previously known cyber leaks. Further, I investigate what security challenges such a leak poses on the US DoD / NATO Alliance both from the perspective of state and non-state actors. Finally, I explore the potential mitigation solutions and emerging regulatory strategies to address AI leaks more generally and in the context of LLMs for national security.
The major emphasis of great power competition has shifted significantly over history. Today, there is widespread disagreement on whether economic or military aims are more important in the sphere of great power competition. The three global superpowers, the United States, China, and Russia, engage in a wide variety of strategic ambitions, including economic influence, military supremacy, territorial domination, and ideological leadership. It is difficult to say which of these endeavors is more important because each has a significant influence on the global power structure. Economic influence is crucial because it determines access to resources, markets, and critical sectors, all of which are critical to economic growth and national security. Military power is also important because it offers deterrent and projection capabilities, which protect national interests and alliances. Nonetheless, the significance of these many competitions may vary depending on each state’s specific aims and circumstances. By evaluating where these nations have invested the most in the previous two decades, we may acquire a sense of the sectors they prioritize.
This study aims to understand how regional powers construct and maintain their autonomies in the sphere of interest under the great power competition in the region. Although, after the Cold War, the international system has evolved to a uni-multipolar structure, it is still dominated by great powers. Regional powers have been threatened and controlled implicitly or explicitly by them. They establish regional multilateral institutions to decrease great powers’ influence while increasing cooperation in maintaining regional autonomy. In this study, as the consensual hegemon of South America, Brazil’s foreign policy towards the region is analyzed, and how the US, the historically dominant, and China, the new great power, impact Brazil’s autonomy is questioned. During the power transition from the US to China, Brazil found room for manoeuvre for its leadership. Brazil’s changing autonomy between 2000-2018 (with a specific focus on after 2008) is examined using the process-tracing technique in a qualitative case study analysis. The impact of great powers on Brazil’s autonomy during this period is analyzed through interviews with foreign policymakers. As an illustrative case, understanding changing Brazil’s regional autonomy under the shadow of US-China relations will guide us in other regional powers’ interactions with great powers regarding regional politics.
The moment GPC as a word flashes, IR enthusiasts are thrown to dwell into the sea of theories that have shaped our understanding of GPC. But what if these theories were to be understood in context of each other and then GPC in context of these theories. Realists, Liberalists and Constructivists are all pointing at the same picture from different angle. This paper tries to take a step back by changing the very picture that these theories have tried to understand. The paper tries to explore the complexities and outcomes of GPC in a world that would have been different. For majority of the time, the power chase has been considered given, and the analysis is always built upon it. This paper is a modest attempt to understand the formation of GPC itself from a changed perspective, with looking at states from a constructivist’s lens, and applying the model of realism and liberalism along with major notions of GPC to comprehend whether the Great Power Competition was always inevitable or is it just how a particular type of human understanding unfolded it in a certain way, and there is always a way to undo it.
Does China successfully wield leadership of UN agenccies to further its own national interests of an alternative global order? We test these expectations to assess whether a rising power uses the position for formal influence—to reward like-minded states—or informal influence—to accumulate prestige.
To probe for formal influence, we leverage a comparative case study approach of 11 different IOs, combining original data collection of 12,481 IO country-projects from 1988-2022 and an ethnographic case study of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). We also conduct an elite conjoint survey experiment with IO staff to test the mechanisms of formal executive influence via a ‘pleasing the principal’ mechanism in which IO staff anticipate a leader’s preferences based on nationality cues, or an ‘agenda-setting mechanism,’ in which leaders overtly indicate their preferences. To examine informal influence, we conduct a survey experiment on representative samples of the public in the US and Brazil to examine whether partnerships between Chinese leaders and IOs enhance China’s image, again leveraging the case of the ITU.
These results have substantial implications for the way that we interpret China’s motivations toward the international order, the independence of IOs, and the broader vitality of IOs in the midst of power transitions.
Note: I do not have travel funds, and would require travel support to be able to participate.
Historians of U.S. foreign relations have broadly identified nationalism as a significant driver of the U.S. expansionist turn in the Asia-Pacific towards the end of the 19th century. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of a particular form of nationalism – economic nationalism – to the dynamics of interstate competition that made this expansion possible. This article argues about the centrality of economic nationalism in this process, which increased great power rivalry in the region between the United States and Japan, Germany, and Russia. The events that followed laid the ground for the subsequent long-term U.S. engagement and expansion in the Asia-Pacific region.
Please note: I will be at IPSI 2023 (Bridging the Gap initiative) in Washington DC between 11 and 15 June included. I am also scheduled to present at SHAFR on 16 June but I would prioritise the CPGC workshop.
With improved transatlantic relations, US-China great power competition has spread to various areas and fields, ranging from critical technologies to supply chains to hypersonic missiles to nuclear missile silos and trade. Given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the European Union (EU) is concerned about the growing Russia-China no-limit partnership and China’s ambiguous stance on the conflict. With EU’s relationship with Russia and China are on a swing, growing Russia-China nexus has made the West-China great power competition tortuous. Given as the Ukraine conflict’s impact grows with China becoming the EU’s strategic rival, it pushed EU members to diversify their reliance and relationship with Russia and China in order to protect their national interests. As China and Russia emphasise ‘indivisible security’ and ‘legitimate concerns’ to protect and promote their national and strategic interests, it is interpreted as an attempt to change the global order. While NATO continues to provide umbrella protection in Europe, it has avoided direct involvement in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China. Thus, it will be a strenuous task for Europe to unite and achieve strategic autonomy, counter the Russian and Chinese threats, and secure its interests on the continent and in the Indo-Pacific region.
With the return of Great Power Competition, naturally, attention turns to critical areas where this competition will manifest. I argue that technology has already begun to form the foreground in this great power competition, and as such, competition in this area will set the tone for the future of this relationship. This competition can be split into two areas. First, there is competition in terms of hardware, such as micro-chips and spy-balloons. Second, there is competition over software, such as artificial intelligence, social media, and cyber-warfare. Technology has formed the foreground in this Great Power Competition because the rules and norms of behaviour in this area are typically newer, less solidified, and weaker than in areas such as economic policy, trade policy, and conventional warfare.